Abstract--With the increased use of wind energy several Transmission System Operators (TSO) have increasing difficulties for congestion forecasting due to the unpredictable nature of the energy source. To maintain the state of the system within acceptable and secure operating conditions, the TSOs require the curtailment of the production of generators to avoid local congestion on the power grid. These actions reduce the revenue of renewable producers and limit the development of green energy. This is because renewable producers with support schemes bear the inherent cost of congestion when they are redispatched. This paper proposes two types of market mechanism that solve the above mentioned problems in case of local congestion. The first mechanism consists in a compensation between renewable producers to limit the amount of redispatched generation in situations when the local congested power grid incorporates only renewable production. If both renewable and conventional productions are connected close to each other, a second mechanism will be used to incentivize competition among power adjustment offers.
I. INTRODUCTION
OR several years, global warming has become a world priority. One of the solutions to solve this problem is the increased use of renewable energy. However, the integration of such a production in the present grid is not easy as this grid was not originally designed to accept this kind of production. In many regions, the Transmission System Operators (TSO) expect an increase of line congestion in rural areas due to the important increase of wind generation [1] . To maintain the state of the system within acceptable and secure operating conditions, operators must apply preventive actions or emergency/correctives actions. These can either be actions on Jacques Deuse is with Suez -Tractebel, avenue Arianne 7, B-1700 Brussels, Belgium. (e-mail: Jacques.deuse@tracebel.com). topology 1 and/or on generation. In this paper, as very limited actions on topology are available in weak networks, the focus will be put on actions on generation to modify the power flow of an overloaded line. However, modifying the power production of a wind power plant reduces its revenue because its remuneration is linked to the generated energy. In this paper, a mechanism is proposed to solve this problem of financial compensation for wind producers in case of local congestion.
Congestion Management (CM) problems were analyzed in the literature. A method classically used by TSOs is to manage congestion in day-ahead planning by curtailment or disconnection of generation using technical and economic criteria [2] . The difficulty of the day-ahead method is to accurately predict magnitude and duration of the congestion. Thus, the main consequence of this approach is a limitation of generation that can be more important than necessary, as a precise day-ahead prediction of wind power is impossible. In the literature, other methods are dedicated to CM. Sensitivitybased optimum generation rescheduling and/or load shedding schemes to alleviate overloading of transmission lines are proposed in [3] and [4] . These methods, based on the computation of an Optimal Power Flow (OPF), are precise approaches for CM as long as generation and transmission capacities are well known. Other approaches are market-based methods for congestion elimination [5] - [7] and are also very efficient as long as two price areas, delimited by the congested elements, can be identified. Furthermore, market-based methods are affected by errors in load and generation prediction caused by element outage or random generation such as wind generation. To avoid forecasting errors, a method using a real time supervisor is proposed in [8] . This method avoids the line congestion while reducing the production constraints to the minimum thanks to the use of automatic corrective actions. Nevertheless, part of the wind generation is lost.
However, these methods do not take into consideration the nature of the source (renewable or conventional) and its impact on the associated loss of revenue. Indeed, wind producers lose money in case of lower production as their revenue is linked to 1 The actions on topology range from bus couplers switching and transformer tap changing to the adjustment of phase shifters. However, in weak networks there are very limited available possibilities. The goal of this paper is to propose a market mechanism that solves the lose revenue problems for wind producers in case of local congestion. This paper is divided as follows. Section II presents an overview of the CM with renewable energy used by European TSOs. In section III, the influence of loss of renewable generation on the congestion cost is studied. Nondiscriminatory market mechanism is presented in section IV for the CM with renewable energy and finally conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. REVIEW OF CM USING RENEWABLE GENERATORS IN EUROPE
This section proposes a comparative review of the German, Spanish and French managements of congestions which are partly due to the presence of wind generators. These three countries are representative of the range of CM methods used in Europe. The regulations for wind energy in the three countries is shown in TABLE I.
As shown in TABLE I, the support scheme for wind energy in Germany, Spain and France is based on feed-in tariffs. The most relevant feature of the feed-in tariff scheme is that it secures a certain income during a fixed time horizon. However, in Spain, power producers using renewable energies can choose between two support schemes, a feed-in tariff system or a market option system (Market price and premium). In 2008, 87% of Spanish wind power producers chose the market option [13] , thanks to the low associated risks introduced by a minimum guaranteed price 2€/MWh lower than the feed-in tariff value when market price is low, and 11.6€/MWh above feed-in tariff value for medium market price and equal to market price when the latter is high [11] . Germany and France have also established different criteria in order to limit the subsidy level to wind power. Germany has defined for each location a reference production model. After 5 years, each installation is compared to a reference model and in case the production has reached more than 150% of the reference production, the feed-in tariff for this installation is decreased by 30%. In France, wind turbines producing less than 2400MWh per installed MW and per year are paid at a high feed-in tariff. For annual production above 2400MWh this feed-in tariff decreases by 17% at 2800MWh and by 66% at 3600MWh [16] .
TABLE I also shows capacity limits in the regulations for wind energy. Capacity limits are either used to define connection voltage levels (Spain and France) or to differentiate the feed-in tariff (Germany and Spain). In Germany, the basic principle regulation about renewable energy is to give priority connection to plants generating electricity from renewable energy sources and to guarantee priority purchase and transmission of all electricity from renewable energy sources. But in France, wind farms must be connected in specific areas to be eligible to the feed-in tariff [15] . These areas are determined taking into account the wind potential of the area, the accommodation capacity of the power grid and Environmental Protection. Based on these criteria, a geographical area, the minimum and maximum power of all facilities (existing and/or future) based in these areas are defined.
These different measures may lead to the emergence of new congestion on the network. In Spain and in Germany, in case of capacity restrictions and for the security of the system, renewable production is defined as priority and conventional power generation must modify their production. Thus, in Germany, renewable energy generation should not be affected by any network congestions, independent of the actual location of the renewable energy sources. However, as network upgrades can take years, the additional connection of new renewable energy sources has been put on hold in some areas, as the existing network capacity is not large enough to guarantee priority production of new renewable energy resources. Therefore, renewable energy generators can agree with the TSO that they can be curtailed in situations where all transmission capacity is already used up by other renewable energy sources. This means that such an agreement allows to connect new renewable generation systems prior to network reinforcement, but, such new units may be curtailed without any financial compensation [10] . In Spain an agreement between TSO and producers for curtailment is not needed; renewable generation can be curtailed as a last resort option. Nevertheless in case of curtailment in real time operation, the renewable producer is partially financially compensated for its lost production at 15% of the electricity market price. For planned curtailment, the renewable producers receive not financial compensation [14] . In France, the situation is different because renewable energy has no priority compared to other production and in case of congestion these may be reduced following a rule based on "lasts-connected are firstscut". Nevertheless, the curtailment duration may not exceed the number of hours defined in their network connection contract. The producers are not compensated for their curtailment.
The three studied countries have different methods to determine which generation source will be curtailed when physical restrictions of power flow in the grid. However in Spain and in Germany, the outcome is the same, i.e. renewable energy sources are typically the last generation source to be curtailed. In France, the result is reversed because of the rule "lasts-connected are firsts-cut" as renewable energy sources are often the last installed. However, in the three countries, renewable energy producers are not financially compensated for curtailments (except in Spain for curtailment in real time operation). This greatly impacts winds producers as they are paid based on their produced energy (except in Spain), and, contrary to conventional production they lose their primary energy source during congestion. Therefore, wind power producers are doubly impacted in case of congestion. As it will be shown in Section III, renewable producers bear the associated congestion cost contrary to classical producers.
III. COST OF CONGESTION AND LOST RENEWABLE ENERGY
To illustrate the present regulation on the congestion cost for renewable producers, the 4-bus test system described in Fig. 1 will be used. The test system represents a part of a regional network. Gen 1 represents a decentralized generator and is connected to node 1. Connected at node 4, Gen4 represents the rest of network. This node is the slack bus. Wind Farms (WF) are connected to nodes 2 and 3. The nominal power and Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) of Gen 1, WF 2, WF 3 and Gen 4 are summarized in TABLE II. The PTDFs of a given line represent the ratio between the power that transits in this line and power exchanged between two nodes. TABLE II, PTDF on line 1-2 for power exchange with node 1 are provided. The total system load is 120MW (100MW at node 1 and 20MW at node 4). It is assumed that in this simple market, Gen 1 will offer 60 €/MWh, Gen 4 will offer 40 €/MWh and the two wind farms are subject to a feed-in tariff set at 80 €/MWh. In the example, WFs have priority, but in the case of curtailment of wind generation, the choice of the reduced wind farm will be the rule "lasts-connected are firsts-cut". Moreover, we consider that the price charged by conventional generators, to reduce or to increase their production in case of congestion, is equal to their price offer on the market. Fig. 1 represents the DC loadflow operating point when high wind speed conditions are present. The power flow in line 1-2 can be estimated using DC load-flow approach by (1).
Here, the power flow in line 1-2 is 70 MW thus the line 1-2 is overloaded because limit capacity of in the line is 50 MW. To solve this problem, different solutions are possible. First, as stated by the rule "lasts-connected are firsts-cut" the choice of one solution will depend on the order of connection of WF to the grid. TABLE III shows the power modification asks to production unit to avoid congestion. In case WF 2 was connected before WF3, WF 3 is completely curtailment. In case WF 3 was the first connected, WF 2 is only reduced by 20 MW. The difference is explained by comparing the PTDF value (TABLE II) of WF 2 (80%) and that of the WF 3 (60%). Indeed, it is more efficient to reduce line 1-2 constraint using a generator at node 2 than a generator at node 1. To illustrate the priority of WF on the CM, the same test system is used but WF are replaced by conventional generators. This is shown in Fig. 2 . Gen 2, Gen 3 produce 50MW and Gen 4 produces 20MW. The marginal cost pricing on the market is 40€/MWh. The offer of Gen 2 and Gen 3 is 30€/MWh causing a congestion on line 1-2. To solve this problem, a re-dispatching will be performed while minimizing congestion cost. The solution is to increase the Gen 4 to 50 MW and reduce Gen 2 to 50 MW. TABLE IV shows the cost comparison for different cases. The column "energy sold" corresponds to the energy sold at marginal cost in the dayahead market for conventional generators and the energy produced for WFs. TABLE IV shows in the case of conventional generators, that the energy cost is unchanged in case of congestion, but the congestion cost increases to 500€/h. However, in the case with WFs and congestion, congestion cost can be increased to 2600€/h this is due to the priority given to wind power which requires the increase of the most expensive group (Gen 1). Moreover, energy sold is lower than in the case with WFs without congestion because curtailments are then applied to wind farms (TABLE III) , thus, the energy cost can be reduced by 5600€/h. Therefore in presence of WF, for the entire system it is preferable that congestion appears in order to reduce the total costs (Energy cost and congestion cost), because the feed-in tariff for wind energy is higher than the price of conventional generation. Moreover, when the conventional producers do not produce, they store their fuel while wind producers cannot. Thus, wind producers are penalized in case of capacity restrictions of the system. One solution is to compensate wind producers for their loss of primary energy source. The difficulty is to define the price of compensation that takes into account both the loss of primary energy source and to maintain reasonable congestion cost.
The next section will propose two mechanisms to identify a price for loss of primary energy source. First, a simple method will reduce the loss of renewable production taking into account the priority of WF. Secondly, a market mechanism for CM is proposed allowing the renewable producers to set their own price for curtailment.
IV. COMPENSATION FOR RENEWABLE PRODUCERS

A. Partial compensation of the renewable producers
In case of congestion, renewable producers could be interested to exchange their place in the order of curtailment. This could be the case if this new order allows less power to be curtailed. In this case, the latest installed producer will financially compensate the curtailed producer such that every actor gets benefits compared to the application of the rule "lasts-connected are firsts-cut". The scenario presented in Fig.  1 , is reconsidered with this approach. TABLE V shows the impact of the partial compensation of the renewable producers on the WF revenue. Therefore, to limit the total amount of redispatched power, production of WF 2 was reduced prior to WF 3. If WF 2 was the first connected, it will be financially compensated by WF 3. The payment of 2400€/h represents the loss of primary energy source of WF 2. Moreover, the comparison of TABLE IV and TABLE V in case WF 2 was the first connected, shows that WF 3 receives 1600€/h against 0€/h. Furthermore, this method allows to minimize the congestion cost to 1600€/h. However, even if the loss of renewable production is reduced, WF 3 is yet penalized. The next section will present a second mechanism to incentivize competition among power adjustment offers.
B. Market mechanism for CM
This mechanism provides an incentive for producers to reduce their production in case of congestion through competition among producers in order to limit the amount of re-dispatched renewable power and so to reduce the associated congestion cost. Under a market mechanism for CM, renewable producers will set their own price to reduce their production. Two scenarios are considered. In the first, renewable producers benefit from a fixed feed-in tariff related to energy produced and this production type has priority. Secondly, all renewable producers sell their energy on a market and this production type has no priority.
1) Fixed feed-in tariff scenario
The scenario presented in Fig. 1 , is reconsidered with this approach. In case WF 3 was the first connected, TABLE III shows the power modification asks to production unit to avoid congestion. If the Gen 1 and Gen 4 offer price are fixed, the congestion cost will depend only on the price for curtailment requested by WF 2. This linear dependence is shown in Fig. 3 . The price offer for the WF 2 can only be negative as wind power producers are paid according to the produced energy. Thus, when its price is 0€/MWh, the congestion cost is equivalent to that of TABLE IV (i.e., 1600€/h). As shown in Fig. 3 , for to limit the congestion cost, it is necessary to cap the price demanded by WF 2. In case when WF 2 was the first connected, the congestion cost will depend on the price for curtailment requested by both WF.
Thus, the congestion cost depends on the order of connection and not on the price for curtailment requested by WF. In conclusion, competition between actors is not possible in the present feed-in tariff rules. Moreover, it's necessary to cap the price requested by WF, for example, the price may be limited to feed-in tariff.
The next section will present the same mechanism when all renewable producers sell their energy on a market and when no priority is given to renewable energy.
2) Energy market scenario
In the future, the development of wind energy will be such that specific rules applied to wind power will be obsolete. Thus, the wind producers will have to participate in the market and they will have no priority. This section presents this evolution. The case presented in Fig. 1 is considered but with a price for wind producers of 0€/MWh that is their marginal cost (we assume perfect competition). Assuming the prices charged by Gen 1 and Gen 4 are equal to the ones of Fig. 1 , in case of congestion, a re-dispatching will be performed while minimizing congestion cost. Fig. 4 shows the congestion cost versus WF 2 and WF 3 price offer for power curtailment.
If both wind producers agree on prices, the congestion cost may be very high, thus a minimum price will be necessary to limit the congestion cost. However, this mechanism creates a competition between the two wind producers as shown in Fig.  4 with the black line delimiting the price region where WF 2 is chosen for power curtailment and where WF 3 is chosen. The area dedicated to the WF 2 is bigger as this production unit benefits from a higher PTDF regarding line 1-2 (TABLE II) . Moreover, as renewable producers have no priority, the choice of the generator which increases is defined according to the minimal congestion cost, after Gen 1 was always used (TABLE III) . This creates a dependency between the price requested by Gen 1 and the price requested by both WF. Indeed, Gen 4 represents the external network and therefore its price offer is not influenced by the local congestion. In this scenario, it will be kept at 40€/MWh. The dependence between the price offer of WF 2 and of Gen 1 is shown in Fig.  5 . The price offer of WF 3 for power curtailment is fixed at - 40€/MWh thus WF 2 will be used if its offer is upper than -100 €/MWh (Fig. 4) . Fig. 5 also illustrates that if the offer of Gen 1 is too high it might not be used. The black line delimits the price region where only Gen 4 is chosen for power curtailment and where Gen 1 and Gen 4 are chosen. In conclusion, in presence of WFs on the market, it is possible to introduce a competition even between Gen 1 and Gen 4 in order to reduce the congestion cost. Nevertheless, a risk exist that local producers agree on their price offer and it is therefore necessary to regulate the market mechanism in case of local congestions.
V. CONCLUSION
The impact of renewable producers on CM is discussed in this paper. A comparative analysis of various rules implemented to CM is presented. The need to compensate renewable producers has been discussed. Two methods of compensation have been analyzed. First, a partial compensation of the renewable producers allows to reduce the loss of renewable production and to minimize the congestion cost. Secondly, a local market mechanism for CM is presented. However, for this last approach to be efficient, present regulations on renewable production priority or incentive feedin tariff should be abandoned. Furthermore, the proposed market mechanisms, applied to local congestions, must be regulated to limit the congestion cost due to the low number of players. 
